Friend Request Accepted: A Case Study of Facebook\u27s Expansionary Network Strategies in India by Thapliyal, Devna
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Communication Theses Department of Communication
Fall 11-27-2012
Friend Request Accepted: A Case Study of
Facebook's Expansionary Network Strategies in
India
Devna Thapliyal
Georgia State University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/communication_theses
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Communication at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Communication Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information,
please contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Thapliyal, Devna, "Friend Request Accepted: A Case Study of Facebook's Expansionary Network Strategies in India." Thesis, Georgia
State University, 2012.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/communication_theses/97
  
FRIEND REQUEST ACCEPTED: A CASE STUDY OF FACEBOOK’S EXPANSIONARY 
NETWORK STRATEGIES IN INDIA 
by 
DEVNA THAPLIYAL 
 
 
Under the direction of Dr. Svetlana Kulikova 
 
ABSTRACT 
Facebook’s status as the world’s largest social networking platform is well documented. 
However, studies focusing on Facebook are largely limited to how individuals and businesses 
use the platform and not on how Facebook expands globally and affects markets and competition 
in foreign countries. Although international communication scholars have scrutinized the 
international expansion of major media corporations like Time Warner, Disney and News Corp., 
analysis on Facebook remains scarce. This thesis seeks to fill in the gap in scholarly research by 
conducting a meso-level (i.e. organizational level) analysis of Facebook’s expansion into 
developing countries through the theoretical lens of networks. The network perspective was 
chosen because it has previously facilitated the most comprehensive analysis of the globalizing 
strategies of media corporations. This paper simultaneously serves as a test of the applicability of 
theories of networked globalization and the Network Society to the global expansion of ICTs, 
and in particular, social-networking websites. 
INDEX WORDS: Facebook, India, Network political economy, Network society, Social 
networking websites, New media, Media globalization 
  
FRIEND REQUEST ACCEPTED: A CASE STUDY OF FACEBOOK’S EXPANSIONARY 
NETWORK STRATEGIES IN INDIA 
 
 
by 
DEVNA THAPLIYAL  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of 
 Master of Arts  
in the College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
2012 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright by  
Devna Thapliyal 
2012  
  
FRIEND REQUEST ACCEPTED: A CASE STUDY OF FACEBOOK’S EXPANSIONARY 
NETWORK STRATEGIES IN INDIA 
By 
 
 
 
DEVNA THAPLIYAL 
 
 
Committee Chair:     Dr. Svetlana Kulikova 
Committee:      Dr. Amelia Arsenault 
                                                                                                    Dr. Hongmei Li  
 
 
 
Electronic Version Approved: 
 
 
Office of Graduate Studies 
College of Arts and Sciences 
Georgia State University 
December 2012 
 
 
iv 
 
DEDICATION 
To my parents, Rakesh and Chitra, and my brother, Racchit. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
v 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
I am deeply grateful to Dr. Svetlana Kulikova and Dr. Amelia Arsenault for their 
patience, dedication and support throughout this project. I would also like to extend my sincere 
thanks to Dr. Hongmei Li for her constructive suggestions on this project.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
vi 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ......................................................................................................... v 
LIST OF TABLES ..................................................................................................................... viii 
LIST OF FIGURES .................................................................................................................... iix 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION ................................................................................................ 1 
1.1 Significance………………………………………………………………………………...3 
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND .................................................................................................. 4 
2.1 Origin.................................................................................................................................... 4 
2.2 Facebook I.P.O. ................................................................................................................... 6 
2.3 Expansion into BRICS Countries………………………………………………………...6 
2.4 Expansion into India ........................................................................................................... 9 
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................. 11 
3.1 American Media Products in the Global Marketplace .................................................. 11 
3.2  The Global Diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies .................. 12 
3.3 How to Frame Media Globalization ................................................................................ 15 
3.4 A Network Perspective on Globalization and the World-wide Expansion of Facebook
 ................................................................................................................................................... 19 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................................................................... 22 
CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY ............................................................................................ 24 
5.1 Theoretical Framework .................................................................................................... 24 
5.2 Method................................................................................................................................ 26 
CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS ......................................................................................................... 26 
6.1 How Facebook Expands its Organizational Network .................................................... 26 
vii 
 
6.1.1 Local Nodes, Global Network...................................................................................... 26 
6.1.2 Replicating Markets, Creating Consumers ................................................................. 28 
6.1.3 Switching Advertising and Audience Networks.......................................................... 32 
6.1.4 Connecting to Parallel Networks of Application Developers ..................................... 33 
6.2 How Facebook’s Strategies Differ From and Affect Competitors ................................ 35 
6.2.1 Comparing Strategies .................................................................................................. 35 
6.2.2 Driving Social Gaming ................................................................................................ 38 
6.2.3 Network Effects, Indigenous Websites in Decline...................................................... 39 
6.3 How Facebook Spreads its Standards among Users ...................................................... 41 
6.3.1 Standards so users “can all connect” ......................................................................... 41 
6.3.2 Crowdsourcing Language Translation ....................................................................... 43 
6.3.3 Cycle of Standard Circulation ..................................................................................... 43 
6. 4 How the Indian State Facilitates and Mitigates the Spread of Facebook’s Standards
 ................................................................................................................................................... 46 
6.4.1 Deregulation and Liberalization of the Indian Economy .......................................... 46 
6.4.2 Counterpower and Resistance via the Indian State.................................................... 47 
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION................................................................................................... 54 
REFERENCES ............................................................................................................................ 58 
 
 
 
 
viii 
 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1 Facebook Statistics in BRICS Countries                                                                           7                                                           
Table 2 Facebook Strategies in BRICS Countries                                                                          9 
Table 3 Top Ten Websites Globally                                                                                          13 
Table 4 Summary of Facebook’s Telecommunications Partnerships in India                              31                               
Table 5 Summary of Social Networking Platforms’ Strategies in India                                       37 
Table 6 Top Ten brands on Facebook India                                                                                  44 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ix 
 
LIST OF FIGURES 
 
Figure 1 Top Ten Global Media Companies in 2010                                                                    12 
Figure 2 Network Map Representing Partnerships with Indian Mobile Phone Service Providers 
and Manufacturers                                                                                                                         32 
Figure 3 Top Six Social Networking Websites – Percentage of Users in India                            35              
Figure 4 Network Map Representing the Impact on Social Networking and Social Gaming 
Platforms in India                                                                                                                          41 
Figure 5 Government Issued Print Ad Warning Indians to use Facebook with Caution              49 
Figure 6 Government Issued Print Ad Warning Indians to use Facebook with Caution              50 
Figure 7 Government Issued Print Ad Warning Indians to use Facebook with Caution              51 
 
1 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
In June 2011, the French government banned the word “Facebook” from being used on 
radio and television news programs, unless the news story referred directly to the social 
networking website. In a statement a spokesperson for the Conseil Superieur de l'Audiovisuelfor, 
France’s electronic media regulation agency, explained the reason for the ban (Fraser, 2011): 
Why give preference to Facebook, which is worth billions of dollars, when there are 
many other social networks that are struggling for recognition? This would be a distortion 
of competition. If we allow Facebook...to be cited on air, it’s opening a Pandora’s Box — 
other social networks will complain to us saying, ‘why not us? 
 
Over the past few years Facebook’s use as a public space for organizations and 
individuals to connect has largely remained unquestioned. Not only did this ban serve as a 
testimony of the social-networking website’s ubiquity and global reach, but it also brought 
attention to the website’s dominance and possible monopoly over the social-networking space, 
something that no government had done before.   
Founded in 2004, by Mark Zuckerberg, Facebook has quickly evolved into the world’s 
largest online social networking platform. Facebook currently has one billion users globally, out 
of which approximately 167 million users are located in the United States (Social Bakers, as of 
November 2012). Access to the platform is free as long as users have an internet or mobile 
connection and declare themselves to be at least 13-years-old. Facebook allows users to connect 
with others online and offers a platform where users can play games, chat with their friends, 
share links and upload an unlimited number of photos. 
Though Facebook was not the first social-networking platform, it quickly surpassed other 
websites such as Friendster, LinkedIn and MySpace in popularity due to the ease with which its 
users can share and access information online (Rusli, 2012). Over the years people have found 
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different uses for Facebook, ranging from political activism (Shirky, 2011) to romance     
(Ehrlich, 2012). And although the website has repeatedly been criticized for its privacy settings        
(Schwartz, 2012) — with $3.7 billion dollars in revenue in 2011 and a billion users — it eclipses 
its competitors both in profits and popularity. 
The popularity of social networking platforms has led the term “networks” to enter 
everyday lexicon, however, there are scholars who argue that networks are the defining feature 
of society itself. According to the sociologist and theorist Manuel Castells (1996), we are 
currently living in a Network Society — where increasingly networks, not hierarchies, are the 
dominant form of organization for non-profits, corporations, governments etc. Similarly, scholar 
David Grewal (2008) identifies the process of globalization as the rise and global spread of 
standards that allow people to coordinate their activities on a global scale and lead to the 
formation of worldwide networks. Numerous scholars have used these theories to map the global 
expansion of media corporations. However, no such study has been done on internet corporations 
and, in particular, social-networking websites, which serve both as user networks and business 
networks. 
Facebook currently stands as the world’s largest social networking website, which 
certainly makes it an attractive network for individuals to join. However, it is also a business 
network, comprised of numerous nodes and associations, which depend on connecting with other 
organizations and businesses in order to expand its business internationally. This thesis 
investigates Facebook’s attempts to expand its business globally through a case study of the 
BRICS countries, with a specific focus on India. It examines these attempts by drawing on 
Castells’ and Grewal’s theories to explore their applicability in explaining how new media 
corporations, in particular social networking platforms, expand globally. The theories help 
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uncover and capture the dynamics and processes underlying Facebook’s expansion into 
developing nations, to what extent this expansion is successful and the effect it has on the its 
competitors and the market. 
1.1 Significance  
The rapid rise of Facebook has motivated many scholars to study the website; however, 
these studies are limited to how individuals, organizations, businesses and marketers use the 
Facebook platform as a tool rather than examining its growth and evolution as a self-propagating 
organization. Furthermore, accounts of how the website has amassed a large user base and the 
impact it has on competition remain scarce. In the past year, particularly in the aftermath of the 
“Arab Spring” in the Middle East and the “Occupy Wall Street” protests in America, there has 
been significant optimism surrounding the role of Facebook as a facilitator of citizen activism. 
Focusing solely on the website’s utility for social activism obscures the fact that it is a publicly 
traded corporation, whose primary motive is to maximize profits for its many stockholders. 
Traditionally media products and media corporations have come under scrutiny for their 
expansion into developing countries, where their presence is seen to affect both indigenous 
cultures and industries. Perhaps because of the novelty of social-networking platforms or the 
optimism that surrounds them, they have not been analyzed from this perspective. 
As mentioned above, while previous studies have focused on how organizations and 
individuals use Facebook, not many have focused on the company’s business strategies. 
Furthermore, no academic research has specifically looked into Facebook’s expansion into 
developing countries from a network perspective. Having undergone economic liberalization 
within the past twenty years and being home to a seventh of the world’s population and the 
world’s largest democracy makes India a compelling case study. By examining  Facebook’s 
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expansion in India, this thesis elucidates how the network is expanding both on the individual 
level by adding users and on the meso (organizational) level by connecting with Indian 
businesses, as well as local and global corporations and the impact it has on the Indian market 
and indigenous competitors.  
CHAPTER 2: BACKGROUND  
2.1 Origin 
Within eight years of its founding, Facebook has evolved into a multi-billion dollar 
corporation and the world’s largest social networking website. Social networking websites are: 
web-based services that allow individuals to (1) construct a public or semi-public profile 
within a bounded system, (2) articulate a list of other users with whom they share a 
connection, and (3) view and traverse their list of connections and those made by others 
within the system (boyd and Ellison, 2007).        
     
Facebook was not the first social-networking website to be available to internet users, but 
it quickly surpassed other social networking websites, such as Friendster, MySpace and 
LinkedIn, and crossed a billion users in 2012. 
In 2004, Mark Zuckerberg, then a sophomore at Harvard University, launched 
Facebook’s website from his dorm room (Kirkpatrick, 2010). At the time, Facebook registration 
was only open to users with a Harvard.edu email address, with the additional requirement that 
they use their real name, making it the first social networking website that validated its users’ 
identity. After gradually expanding services to other colleges and universities, certain companies, 
and high school students (Metz, 2004), in September 2006, the website opened its doors to 
anyone who had an email address and was over 13-years of age. According to Facebook, this 
decision was taken so that internet users who were not in college or working “can all connect” 
using the platform (Abram, 2006). By January 2007, merely three months after Facebook opened 
its membership to everyone, the number of users climbed from nine million to 14 million, and it 
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appeared that the company’s move paid off as millions of users from all over the world 
scrambled to be a part of the website. 
To get its newly acquired users to spend as much time on the website as possible, the 
company announced that it would launch a Facebook platform that would allow independent 
developers access to the website’s social graph1 and to create and run applications on the 
website. As of April 2012, there were over nine million applications integrated with Facebook 
(Darwell, 2012). Facebook also allowed brands, individuals, organizations and businesses to 
connect directly with audiences through Facebook Pages. While opening the website to everyone 
and adding applications attracted users to Facebook, Facebook Pages proved to be extremely 
popular with advertisers and by April 2012, there were 42 million Facebook Pages on the 
website (Darwell, 2012). 
Facebook’s immense popularity led to staggering financial success. In 2007, a year after 
declining Yahoo Inc.’s one-billion-dollar takeover offer, Facebook sold a 1.6% stake in the 
company to Microsoft for $240 million dollars, which valued the three-year-old company at $15 
billion. The website, which makes a majority of its revenue through display advertising, earned 
$3.7 billion and posted a profit of one billion dollars in 2011 (Raice, 2012). Although, typical of 
large media and internet companies, the sum was much greater than the earnings of other social 
networking platforms. 
 
 
                                                          
1
 According to Facebook’s website, the “social graph” represents “people and the connections they have to 
everything they care about.” And the Graph API “presents a simple, consistent view of the Facebook social graph, 
uniformly representing objects in the graph (e.g., people, photos, events, and pages) and the connections between 
them (e.g., friend relationships, shared content, and photo tags).” 
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2.2 Facebook I.P.O.  
 In a move to go public the company filed for an I.P.O. in February 2012.The news of 
Facebook going public soon raised questions about how it would balance advertising profits and 
user privacy and whether it could manage to grow globally (Raice, 2012). Facebook held its 
much anticipated I.P.O. on May 18, 2012. It offered buyers a 15 % stake in the company at $38 a 
share, which valued Facebook at $104 billion. By the end of the day 421 million Facebook 
shares were traded on Wall Street, valuing the company at $104.2 billion (Spears & Frier, 2012).  
Even with its large valuation Facebook’s stock did not gather steam and hit an all-time 
low at the end of July. This was due to a decline in the number of its web users and the fact that 
Facebook’s second quarter earnings were seen as dismal by many (Blodget, 2012). Since the 
company was still struggling with producing a proven advertising plan for its website and with 
coming up with ways to monetize its mobile application, consumers and advertisers questioned 
whether it had a sound business model that would drive revenue growth (Ortutay, 2012). 
Questions about the website’s international expansion were raised simultaneously as most of 
Facebook’s international users access the website via mobile phones (Darwell, 2012; Bea, 2012).   
2.3 Expansion into BRICS Countries 
Though a majority of Facebook’s revenue comes from the United States, non-domestic 
sources have accounted for an increasing percentage of its revenue over the past few years. In 
2009, about a third of the company’s revenue was brought in from non-domestic markets; by 
2011 the number rose to 44% (Tsukayama, 2012). With more than half of the U.S. population 
already on Facebook (Chapple, 2012) and 60% of the online population in U.K. registered on the 
website (Giles, 2012), the company turned toward developing countries as areas of potential 
growth (Lakhotia, 2012). Facebook has successfully expanded into Brazil and India and between 
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2010 and 2012 it has surpassed the Google-owned social networking website Orkut to become 
the top social networking website in both nations (Radwanick 2012; Radwanick, 2010). In 2012, 
the company recognized India and the BRICS countries as sites of further growth and noted in 
their S-1 filing that they “had 46 million MAUs [Monthly Active Users] in India as of December 
31, 2011, an increase of 132 per cent from the prior year” and spelling out its strategy for 
international expansion Facebook added that it would “continue to focus on growing our user 
base across all geographies, including relatively less-penetrated, large markets such as Brazil, 
Germany, India, Japan, Russia, and South Korea” (Times of India, 2012; Economic Times, 
2012).   
Table 1 Facebook Statistics in BRICS Countries                                                                        
Country Number of Users* Penetration of Total 
Population 
Penetration of Online 
Population 
Brazil 60, 665,740 28.75% 76.13% 
Russia 7,148, 320 4.60% 10.74% 
India 60, 545,100 4.67% 67.60% 
China 583, 840 0.04% 0.14% 
South Africa 6,548,940 11.06% 100% 
*As of November 2012                                                                          Data Source: Social Bakers 
                  
Since Facebook’s financial success is predicated on its ability to attract potential 
consumers to advertisers, efforts to expand into nations with developing economies and large 
populations is a top priority for the company. Facebook enjoys positive network externalities 
(Wright, 2012), i.e. as more people join the network, the network becomes more useful and 
valuable. Therefore, while the number of current users on the website makes it an attractive 
social network for users to join, if it manages to successfully expand into foreign countries with 
large populations, the website will be an attractive venue for advertisers too.                         
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The BRICS countries (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) are home to 41% of 
the world’s population and account for almost a fifth of the world’s GDP (Portal Brasil, 2012), 
which makes them a lucrative site for Facebook’s expansion. In 2010, in an effort to increase its 
user base in Russia, the company participated in talks with local mobile phone operators 
(Novosti, 2010).  Facebook, at the time, was the 5th most popular social networking website in 
Russia, a country where users spend the most amount of time on social networking websites 
(Ioffe, 2010). Facebook adopted a similar strategy to expand into India and partnered first with 
Airtel, one of India’s largest telecom companies, and then more recently with Mediatek, a low-
end cell phone manufacturer, in order to provide free access to the website on Indian cell phones 
(Airtel, 2010; Ricknas, 2011).      
Much like another American internet giant, Google, Facebook has not successfully 
expanded into China. While Zuckerberg’s 2010 visit to China triggered rumors of possible 
expansion into the nation, two years later no deal has materialized (Anna, 2010). The absence of 
global players in the Chinese market provides an advantage to indigenous companies (Singh, 
2012). According to the web analytics website, SocialBakers, there are currently half a million 
Facebook users in China, who access the website through virtual private networks (Singh 2012) 
Facebook, however, cannot officially monetize these users’ activity, since it cannot sell any 
advertising that targets Chinese users.  
MXit is currently South Africa’s most popular social networking website with almost 10 
million users followed by Facebook, which occupies second place and is adding users at a steady 
pace (Vermeulen, 2012) At the end of August there were 5.33 million Facebook users in South 
Africa (Peter, 2012) out of whom 80.5% of users access the website from their mobile phones 
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(Marc, 2012) Facebook has penetrated 11.06 % of the South African population, with Facebook 
mobile being the primary driving force in the websites growth in South Africa (Peter, 2012). 
In contrast to South Africa,  Facebook has achieved the top position among social 
networking websites in Brazil, where according to Nielsen Ratings (Lunden, 2012) 38 million 
users logged on to the website in March 2012. Facebook adoption initially lagged in Brazil and 
in August 2011 Facebook opened an office in Sao Paulo to connect with local businesses 
(Prescott, 2011). By the end of 2011 Facebook audience had tripled from the end of 2010 and by 
the end of 2011 the website surpassed Orkut in popularity. 
Table 2 Facebook Strategies in BRICS Countries 
Country Standards so 
users “can all 
connect” 
Yes/No 
Platform open 
for third-party 
developers 
Yes/No 
Physical Office 
Yes/No 
Partnerships with 
Telecom 
Providers 
Yes/No 
Brazil Yes Yes Yes No 
Russia Yes Yes No Yes 
India Yes Yes Yes Yes 
China Yes Yes No No 
South Africa Yes Yes No No 
 
2.4 Expansion into India 
Once Facebook changed the standards for inclusion in its user network and allowed 
anyone with an email address to register for an account, the website was officially open to all 
Indians with an internet connection. In July 2010, Facebook opened an office in the country, in 
the city of Hyderabad. Just two months later, the website overtook Google-owned social 
networking website Orkut and other indigenous competitors, such as Ibibo and Bharatstudent, 
and became the top social networking website in India2.       
                                                          
2
 According to Alexa as of July 2012, Facebook also ranks as India’s 3rd most popular website. 
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In November, 2011, Vaughan Smith, the company’s vice-president for mobile 
partnership and corporate development, highlighted India as a key region for Facebook’s growth 
and said, “India is our third largest market in terms of number of users and what we're excited 
about and why we're here is because some time in the future, we think that India will pass first 
Indonesia, which should happen soon, and then US” (Aulakh, 2011).                                              
 Currently, 121 million Indians are logged on to the internet, which although is a large 
number, is only a small proportion of the total population of 1.2 billion. In comparison to internet 
users there are a far greater number of mobile subscribers in India, with the number currently at 
900 million. More than a half of the internet users in the country access the internet solely from 
their phones (Vaidyanathan, 2012). While Facebook makes an average of $3.20 per user for 
users from North America, it only makes $0.55 per user for users from Asia (Darwell, 2012); 
therefore, for the company to see a significant revenue growth in India it needs attract more 
mobile phone users and monetize their membership effectively. The large untapped market of 
mobile users, the company’s rapid rise in India and ambitious plans for future growth make the 
country a compelling case study.                  
 Facebook has adopted a similar expansionary strategy in most BRICS nations, with the 
exception of China where it is banned. Facebook’s rise and popularity in Brazil and India shows 
that its strategy to expand into some developing countries has been successful. However, the 
company has failed to break into China, due to heavy internet censorship among other reasons, 
or achieve a top position in Russia and South Africa. This raises several questions about the 
company’s international expansion strategies and the degree to which they are successful - 
questions that this thesis seeks to answer. 
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CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
3.1 American Media Products in the Global Marketplace 
American cultural and media products have typically dominated and still continue to 
dominate the global marketplace. Out of the top ten media companies in the world, ranked 
according to revenue, seven are housed in the United States (see Figure 2). While not a 
significant importer of television programming, America is the top exporter of television 
products with 60% of broadcasted television in the European Union being produced in the 
United States. In 2011, the American television industry earned $4.8 billion through its television 
exports (Kaczanowska, 2012a). Furthermore, the country is also home to the most profitable film 
industry in the world that in 2011 earned almost $4.4 billion through exporting films to foreign 
markets (Kaczanowska, 2012b). After American media products, it is media from other Western, 
developed nations that enjoy access to the largest number of audiences worldwide (Thussu, 
2010). As a result, not only do Western nations reap the benefits of economic power, but 
theyalso gain an upper hand in the power struggle in the global information economy (Thussu 
2010, p. 236). 
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Figure 1 Top Ten Global Media Companies in 2010                                      Source: Statista 2010 
 
3.2 The Global Diffusion of Information and Communication Technologies 
The diffusion of information and communication technologies (ICTs) has produced 
similar results globally. Not only does the U.S. account for 50 percent of the web’s total traffic, it 
is also the center of internet traffic due to its centrality in international networks of hyperlinks 
and infrastructure (McPhail, 2006, p. 305-306). In this vein Weber and Bussell (2005, p.64) note 
that: 
From a global macro-perspective, the international political economy has changed 
little…the supposed “end of geography” effect has been anything but: look at a map of 
Internet bandwidth and notice the thickness of the lines that converge on North America 
relative to the extraordinarily thin coverage in the global South…The geography of 
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telecommunications is almost painfully reminiscent of colonial railroads that ran toward 
export ports but systematically avoided direct inter-colonial connections.        
 
It is particularly important to note the worldwide presence of U.S. based new media and 
the fact U.S companies have created transnational new media platforms that other newer rivals 
will find difficult to challenge. American companies own eight of the world’s top ten websites, 
ranked by traffic (see Table 3). However, the foray of U.S. based corporations, such as 
Facebook, into foreign markets marks a struggle. This is because some new sites of economic 
dynamism and market strength that are emerging are increasingly difficult to penetrate  
because a state might reserve its market for home grown companies3 (Schiller, 2011).   
 
Table 3 Top Ten Websites Globally                                                                                            
Rank  Website Country of Origin 
1 Facebook USA 
2 Google USA 
3 YouTube USA 
4 Yahoo! USA 
5 Baidu China 
6 Wikipedia USA 
7 Windows Live USA 
8 Twitter USA 
9 QQ.com China 
10 Amazon.com USA 
Data Source: Alexa, July 2012 
Closely tied to the global spread of the internet and ICTs is the rhetoric of development 
and democratization associated with these technologies. Consequently, a majority of 
communication research focuses on the role they play in development and/or democratization. 
The idea that communication technologies, such as computers, mobile phones, internet etc., can 
bring about socio-economic development and help reduce disparities between the developed and 
                                                          
3
 China is an example of one such country. 
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underdeveloped nations has gathered support from both scholars and policy makers alike                                
(De & Ratan, 2009). Central to this belief is the claim that these newfound skills will help them 
overcome the barriers to inclusion in the global information society and allow them to compete 
in the global knowledge economy (Shields, 2011). 
Similarly, over the past few years, especially following the “Arab Spring,” the 
democratizing potential of these technologies has attracted substantial attention. Scholars have 
debated whether ICTs, especially social media, help (e.g. Shirky 2009, 2010; Diamond, 2010) or 
hinder (e.g. Morozov 2009, 2010; Gladwell, 2010) citizen activism. A number of recent books 
have focused on the emancipatory potential of these technologies in authoritarian regimes (e.g. 
Yang & Stening 2009; Howard 2010; Zhang 2009) as well as books that warn of how political 
actors can use the same technologies for oppression (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006; Morozov 2011). 
What is missing from these accounts is that the providers of these technologies are often large 
companies whose motive is to maximize profits. Solely treating the technologies as agents of 
emancipation/oppression obscures the fact that these web 2.0 platforms are public spheres 
operated by the private sector (Mackinnon, 2012, p.9) and the profit making motives of the 
organizations that own them. 
Indeed, the worldwide spread of ICTs has given audiences new ways to create and share 
information. Unlike any other time in history users now have the capacity to transmit messages 
from one to many - or engage in “autonomous mass self-communication” (Castells, 2007; 
Arsenault & Castells 2008a). Arsenault and Castells (2008a, p. 710) explain mass self-
communication as: 
the communication processes taking place in a global web of horizontal communication 
networks that include the multimodal exchange of interactive messages and documents 
from many-to-many in chosen time. It is mass communication because it reaches 
potentially a global audience. But it is self-communication because individuals 
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potentially generate their own content, choose the platform for its emission, and play an 
active role in shaping the reception process. 
 
However, the authors add that though this form of communication gives users freedom, it 
also gives media businesses new markets to expand into, new content to monetize and new 
platforms to privatize (Arsenault & Castells, 2008a). 
What is missing from previous scholarship on ICTs are questions of power and 
ownership; previous research assigns power to states while completely overlooking corporate 
actors. Furthermore, almost no research focuses on the effect the adoption of these new media 
has on indigenously-developed new media. Numerous scholars have warned of the drawbacks of 
solely concentrating on the uses of new media and not on the structures and agents that shape 
these environments, in particular corporate actors (Mansell 2004; Boyd-Barrett 2003; 
MacKinnon, 2012; Pereira, 2009). Similarly, Valtysson points out that: 
despite the empowering, emancipative potentials of the various social network sites, it 
is still media power on a macro scale that designs the media environments for the best 
known and widely used web 2.0 platforms...One has only to think of the large multi-
media corporations and Internet companies ...and their different media holdings and 
ownership relations ... to get another more colonizing view of the emancipative promises 
of the Internet, and the current media landscape (2012, p.81). 
 
3.3 How to Frame Media Globalization 
Before analyzing the international expansion of Facebook, I turn to theories and methods 
that have previously been used to frame and analyze the international flow of media content in 
the current globalized landscape. While globalization is nothing new, it “assumes a defining 
form in each epoch and also shapes each epoch” (Boyd-Barrett, 2003, p.25).  The media play a 
crucial role in shaping the processes of globalization because not only are media corporations 
increasingly globalizing their operations, but they also develop the infrastructure that facilitates 
global commercial activity and provide the images and information for us to make sense of 
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events occurring in far corners of the world (Flew, 2007). Therefore, any research on 
internationalization strategies media organizations should be framed in the context of 
globalization and the global flow of media. 
For decades the advocates of cultural and structural theories of imperialism have 
explained that the predominantly one-way transfer of media, ideas, products and information 
from the West to the rest of the world, often occurs at the risk of destroying local cultures and 
industries (Schiller 1992; Boyd-Barrett 1997). The flow of media content from the West, 
therefore, is seen as an extension of Western domination over the rest of the world. The cultural 
imperialism theory states that the proliferation of Western produced mass media in developing 
nations destroys local media industries and acts as an agent of cultural homogenization and 
American political hegemony (Hallin and Mancini, 2004). 
For example, Schiller (1991) argues that that instead of weapons the tools of cultural 
domination today are Western owned transnational corporations that that dominate the world 
market economy and most modes of media production and distribution. Schiller employs the 
concept of “soft power,” which is the ability of a nation or corporation to get what they want by 
co-opting with the use of cultural products and ideas rather than force, to show a shift in the type 
of power exercised by the dominant. According to Schiller, this is cause for concern because the 
hegemony of the West impacts developing nations both economically and culturally while acting 
in the benefit of the developed West. Although most cultural and media studies scholars today 
reject the theory citing its overly simplistic nature and for assuming that foreign media has a 
“direct, unmediated impact on audience behavior and worldview” (Kavoori & Chadha, 2000, p. 
416), its proponents warn of the dependency and dominance that Western media creates and 
regard media imperialism to be a tool of cultural domination much like colonialism was in the 
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past. More recently, Boyd-Barrett (2010) has made the argument that the media imperialism 
theory is still a valid way of thinking about U.S. domination through media and even argues that 
it is applicable to the U.S. domination of ICTs (Boyd-Barrett, 2006).                
 Although to some scholars the current globalized landscape poses an ever increasing 
threat of cultural homogeneity, others adopt a more pluralistic view and argue that cultural 
imperialism is too simplistic a concept and does not capture the intricacies of the globalized 
landscape. Appadurai (2010) describes this worldwide spread as occurring through ‘scapes,’ that 
interact in multiple ways to affect the global and local economies, culture and politics. According 
to him, these scapes constitute the move of money, people, ideas, technology and media across 
the world in a highly non-uniform way. He adds that the relationship between these scapes is 
highly disjunctive and unpredictable and how they interact with each other depends primarily on 
the situation. This has profound implications for those who fear the Americanization or 
Westernization of the world, since these disjunctures produce unexpected results and produce 
cultural heterogeneity and not dominance. Though Appadurai’s theorization of globalization is 
useful because it compels us to look beyond the state as the main source of hegemony and 
dominance, overall, it fails to take into account the internal dynamics of media organizations 
(Flew, 2007) and the political and economic structures that enable and control these movements 
of money, people, ideas, technology and the media (Ong, 1997, p. 11). 
More recently, Thussu (2010) uses the concept of media flows in political economy 
analysis and maps the various flows of media that mark the global landscape by dividing them 
into two broad categories - dominant flows and contra or subaltern flows. Global media flows, 
according to Thussu, emanate largely from the United States and originate primarily in the West 
with the only exception being that of Japan. The United States emerges as the largest exporter of 
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cultural and entertainment media products and leads in the profit made from these industries too. 
According to Thussu, the widespread reach of American media allows the U.S. to exercise its 
soft power and promote the nation’s economic and political interests. Thussu emphasizes the 
great disparity in the economic value of the dominant flows in comparison to the contra-flows. 
While he acknowledges the various contra-flows that mark the global media landscape, he 
asserts that merely the presence of a non-Western media flow is no reason to celebrate the end of 
Western media hegemony.   
Though useful for highlighting the global North-South divide in global media 
distribution, mapping global flows does not shed light on the processes through which Western 
media maintain their dominance in the global media landscape. Furthermore, using the state as 
the unit of analysis can conceal where power really lies (state vs. multi-national corporations) 
and obscure instances where the origin of these contra-flows have close ties to Western capital 
and corporations. To elucidate how media globalization underpins domination, a closer look at 
the processes through which media corporations make their way into countries is needed. For 
example, Thussu’s (2007) research on News Corp.’s expansion into India provides a rich and 
detailed account of the strategies that a Western corporation may use in expanding to other 
countries, how it leverages connections with both state and corporate actors to advance its goals 
and, finally, how its presence in the country affects both the market and its competitors. 
Similarly, Arsenault and Castells’ macro-level study of the largest media conglomerates 
(2008a) and research on News Corp. (2008b) sheds light on the strategies and processes through 
which these corporations advance their corporate goals,  maintain their dominance and exercise 
their power. Rooted in the idea of a Network Society, the authors do not use a single media 
corporation as the unit of analysis, but map the network of global media corporations and the 
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corporations’ specific place in it. Their analyses show that no corporation is truly global, rather 
the truly global entity is the network of multi-media corporations. The mapping of the global 
networks of media networks reveals that rivals often collude/compete on a case-by-case basis 
and link up with local organizations to expand internationally. The authors note that the ability of 
a corporation to connect to local partners and distribution channels is critical to the success of its 
global expansion (Arsenualt and Castells, p.708, 2008). Furthermore, their studies show that 
global media corporations localize their content to fit the market they are catering to and also 
help spread a corporate driven media model in these markets. Thus, they act as agents of 
localization and globalization simultaneously. Finally, their research shows that states exercise 
their power over global networks by controlling who enters their market and who can access 
their markets. Treating the network, and not the corporation as the unit of analysis, allows the 
authors to account for the horizontal networks of mass self-communication of users, while 
simultaneously highlighting how being a part of the global network of multi-media corporations 
is a source of power and resources. 
 
3.4 A Network Perspective on Globalization and the World-wide Expansion of Facebook  
Facebook’s international expansion cannot be analyzed without first addressing the 
underlying factors that enabled the creation and expansion of the multinational internet-based 
company. Facebook’s global expansion is both symptomatic of and facilitated by globalization 
and the emergence of a global economy. While globalization is by no means a new phenomenon, 
it is only recently, in the late twentieth century, that we have witnessed a rise of a global 
economy based on infrastructure of information and communication technologies (Castells, 
1996, p. 93). While some see the process of globalization as a “flattening” of the world 
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(Friedman, 2007) to others it is an uneven, complex, overlapping disjunctive order resulting from 
the differences in flows of technology, people, ideas, media and money across the world 
(Appadurai, 2010). However, ultimately, these perspectives fall short of explaining how the 
global economy, which is “an economy with the capacity to work as a unit in real time on a 
planetary scale,” really functions (Castells, 1996, p. 92).                                      
 According to Grewal, “globalization can be understood as the rise to dominance of 
shared forms of social coordination,” that allow people to coordinate activities on a global scale 
and lead to the creation of worldwide networks (2008, p.3). Therefore, examining globalization 
from a network perspective is particularly useful. Grewal argues that globalization can be best be 
understood by examining these networks and the standards that are required to be a part of them. 
He adds that what we see as globalization today is actually, “the creation of an international in-
group that welcomes the entire globe on settled terms: a new world order in which we clamor for 
connection to one another using standards that are offered up for universal use” and while these 
global standards may be accessed by all, not many play a role in their establishment (Grewal, 
2008, p.3). This means that those who have the ability to create these networks wield the most 
power and influence in society.                                                                                         
The term “network” refers to relationships between objects or nodes, which can be 
organizations, human or even machines, which are linked to each other through associations. 
These associations can be interpersonal relationships, corporate alliances, exchange of 
information, etc. (Arsenault, 2011b, p. 2) According to theorist Manuel Castells networks 
“constitute the new social morphology of our society… [and] are open structures, able to expand 
without limits, integrating new nodes” (Castells, 2000, p. 500 -501), which allows them to 
expand globally. Nodes within a network vary in their importance to the network and a node’s 
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function depends on both its interaction with other nodes within the network and on the overall 
program of the network (Castells, 2009, p. 19). The interconnection of nodes does not imply that 
the network society is devoid of any power structures. In fact, power in the network society is 
exercised through these networks.                                                               
The “standards” are the shared norms and practices that allow nodes to access one 
another within a particular network (Grewal, 2008, p. 21). People’s desire to access members of 
a certain network can result in the spread of certain standards. This takes place through the 
adoption of standards by outsiders who previously were not part of the network (Grewal, 2008, 
p.23). The “standard” for joining Facebook’s social network is simply having a mobile or 
internet connection and declaring oneself as at least 13 years of age, which allows it to spread 
easily among users. The most valuable standards are those that are adopted by the greatest 
number of people; and since valuable networks can attract users from other networks there is a 
possibility that alternative standards can get eliminated over time (Grewal, 2008, p. 25-26). The 
global popularity of Facebook, thus, presents a challenge to both its global and regional 
competitors.                          
 The possibility that the adoption of certain standards may lead to the elimination of others 
is a source of inequality in the current global economy.  Therefore, Facebook poses the greatest 
threat to other social-networking platforms; their use may decline because Facebook may be 
perceived as a more attractive network to join based on its popularity. Furthermore, those who 
are members of networks that constitute the core of the global economy hold power over those 
who are excluded from these networks (Castells, 2011, p. 774). Power also lies in the hands of 
social actors who have the ability to program networks according to their goals and/or those who 
possess the ability to connect different networks by sharing resources and common goals 
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(Castells, 2011, p. 776). Thus, networked forms of organization may privilege some individuals 
and the networks joined by switchers who co-ordinate network activities and share resources 
while leaving others behind.                                                                                             
Network power can also make people change networks. If one views a certain network as 
more attractive based on its members or the standard that connects it, s/he can either leave 
his/her network and join the other, or, whenever possible, be a part of both simultaneously 
(Grewal, 2008, p. 28). It is important to note that while networks have the power of coercion, 
they cannot take agency away from people. Counterpower, which is the ability of social actors to 
resist network power, is exercised through the very mechanisms that enforce power (Castells, 
2011. p. 78). Counterpower, therefore, can be exercised by “fighting to change the programs of 
specific networks and by the effort to disrupt the switches that reflect dominant interests and 
replace them with alternative switches between networks” (Castells, 2011, p. 773).                        
Facebook possesses the ability to exercise its network power on two distinct levels. 
Facebook is currently the world’s most popular social networking website and network 
externalities make it an attractive social network for users to join. However, it also serves as a 
switch between business networks and its user network, which is a source of power for the 
company among corporations. This thesis draws on concepts of network power, standards and 
counter-power to examine Facebook’s expansion into developing countries through the case 
study of India.     
 
CHAPTER 4: RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This thesis examines Facebook’s expansion strategies in India through the theoretical 
lens of networks and using Castells’ and Grewal’s theories of power and processes in the 
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Network Society. Based on the subject of inquiry and the review of literature this study is 
designed to answer the following questions. 
As indicated by Arsenault and Castells (2008) and Thussu (2007), media corporations 
network with both global and local organizations on a case-by-case basis in expanding to other 
countries. Therefore, I ask:  
RQ1: a) what are the standards for inclusion in Facebook’s corporate network and how does 
Facebook circulate these standards? 
b) What specific horizontal and vertical networking strategies did Facebook adopt to successfully 
expand into India? 
Similarly, past studies have shown that while expanding operations in other countries 
large media organizations affect both the market and their competitors. RQ 2 is formulated with 
this is mind. 
RQ2: How are Facebook’s expansionary strategies similar or different from:  
a) its global competitors 
b) its local competitors, indigenously created social networking platforms 
c) and, how does Facebook’s network power affect them? 
Facebook’s customers are advertisers and its product, its user network. Examining user 
behavior - how Facebook users employ the website for interpersonal and mass self-
communication- is beyond the scope of this project. RQ3 focuses instead on corporate strategy, 
how Facebook expands its user network and collects more eyeballs for its many advertisers. 
RQ3: What specific strategies has Facebook adopted to circulate its standards among Indian 
users and how does it make the adoption of these standards easier for them? 
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In the process of expanding to other countries media corporations do not just “roll over” 
the nation state (Flew, 2011). The state acts to facilitate and hinder the international expansion of 
media corporations. My next question is designed to explore the role the Indian government has 
played in assisting and/or blocking Facebook’s expansion into India. 
RQ4: a) What role has state regulation/deregulation played in the expansion of Facebook into 
India, more specifically, how has it allowed/blocked Facebook from circulating its standards?   
b) How does the Indian state exercise its counter-power against Facebook’s unbridled expansion 
into the country? 
The method and theoretical framework I will used to answer these questions are discussed in the 
next section.  
CHAPTER 5: METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Theoretical Framework 
In the past scholars have used the network perspective to examine the role Facebook 
plays in the accumulation of social capital (Ellison, Steinfield & Lampe, 2007),  in strengthening 
bonds with weak ties (DiMicco et al, 2008), and to uncover patterns of information revelation 
and their impact on privacy (Gross & Acquisti, 2005). While previous studies have focused 
extensively on the social networks formed through the website, none of them have examined 
how Facebook, the company, expands its corporate network and maximizes its network power. 
Previous studies on multi-national media corporations, such as News Corp. and Disney 
(Arsenault & Castells, 2008a; Arsenault 2011a) have used network analysis to show how these 
organizations leverage power in the network society; however, these studies have not been 
extended to social-networking websites. Applying this method to Facebook provides insight into 
how internet-based corporations negotiate the power dynamics of networks to maximize their 
financial gains.                                                                                                      
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  Flew (2011, p. 100) argues that: 
Internationalization strategies of large media corporations need to be subjected to more 
empirical analysis, to better understand the motivations that underpin international 
expansion, the relative success of these strategies, the relationships that emerge with the 
nation-states of the host countries, and the effectiveness of competition they face from 
local industries 
 
Keeping these points in mind, I take a “network political economy” approach (Arsenault, 
2011a, p.102) in examining the overseas expansion strategies of Facebook. A network political 
economy approach does not replace traditional methods of political economy research, but 
complements them. The method differs from political economy because it sees networks as the 
defining features of international media and communication corporations (Arsenault, 2011a, 
p.102).                                                                                                                       
 A network political economy approach also goes beyond analyzing capital and markets 
and instead focuses on analyzing the programs, processes and structures that characterize the 
network and the nodes and associations that constitute it (Arsenault, 2011a). The network 
political economy perspective does not focus solely on consolidation and competition within 
markets, but assigns great importance to processes of collaboration between network nodes. 
Furthermore, this approach, in contrast to the political economy approach, sees power as 
embedded in networks and not in corporate hierarchies. Power, then, is not concentrated in one 
corporation but is “embedded in the processes of association between key nodes in the network, 
which may include regulators, relevant political agencies and equipment manufacturers” 
(Arsenault, 2011a, p. 103). 
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5.2 Method 
     The chosen method for this project is a qualitative case study using qualitative network 
analysis. As part of my analysis, I map the network of Facebook’s expansion into India by 
tracing the various nodes that Facebook connects with and the types of associations or ties 
between Facebook and these nodes. Nodes include people, businesses and corporations and the 
associations or ties include partnerships, the flow of money and the sharing of technology. 
 Case studies enable researchers to gain a holistic perspective and observe phenomena that 
may be emergent and/or fleeting (Noor, 2008). A drawback of case studies is that they lack 
generalizability (Ibid.). However, since preliminary research has shown that Facebook has 
adopted similar expansionary strategies in developing countries, looking closely at its expansion 
in India will illustrate, to a certain extent, the process of its expansion in all developing countries.  
 
CHAPTER 6: ANALYSIS 
6.1 How Facebook Expands its Organizational Network 
6.1.1 Local Nodes, Global Network  
Early in 2010, Facebook announced its plans to open an office in Hyderabad, India 
through a blog post on its website. This was the first step the company took to strategically 
expand their organizational network in India (Faul, 2010). Facebook announced that it planned 
on investing $150 million on opening an office in the southern Indian city and would hire up to 
500 people to work from the new location (Pahwa, 2010). These plans were made public at a 
time when eight million Indians had already created a Facebook account and numbers were 
steadily continuing to rise. Hyderabad was chosen because it is an I.T. hub, housing the offices 
of many other large corporations, such as Google and Microsoft. Being in the region provided 
Facebook with access to a skilled and cheap labor force;  made it easier to connect with other 
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companies and advertisers in the South Asian region (Reuters, 2010);  and facilitated more 
effective communication with the Indian government at the local, state and national level 
(Pahwa, 2010).          
 Kirthiga Reddy, an Indian expat previously based in the U.S., was chosen as Head and 
Director of Online Operations for Facebook India, along with Manoj Varghese who would serve 
as Director of User Operations. Reddy and Varghese had previously worked with American 
multinationals.  Prior to joining Facebook Reddy worked for Motorola and Phoenix 
Technologies and Varghese for Google and Dell India (Pahwa, 2010). The two had previously 
helped these companies expand and maintain their operations in India. In October 2011, the 
company also hired Ankhi Das as their Head of Public Policy for India. Das, who had earlier 
served as Director of Public Policy for Microsoft India, was hired to deal with the Indian 
government’s demands that all material uploaded on Facebook’s social networking website be 
pre-screened (Business Standard, 2011). By setting up an Indian office Facebook was able to tap 
into the network of Indian professionals and recruit them to work for Facebook India.   
 The success of a corporation’s expansion is predicated on how well it can connect to 
local channels of distribution and local partners (Arsenualt and Castells, 2008a). As stated 
earlier, today media corporations are organized in a global network that allows them to operate in 
different parts of the world through partnerships and alliances. However, not only are these 
corporations interconnected nodes in a global network, but they also function as a network 
internally with internationally distributed nodes (Ghosal and Bartlett, 1990). By opening an 
office in India, Facebook can connect with local partners in India while remaining rooted in the 
U.S. (currently its largest market in terms of revenue). The Facebook India office serves as a 
node in Facebook’s internal network. While it operates independently, adapting to the legal, 
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political and economic environment of the region, it is ultimately governed by the programming 
and the goals set by Facebook’s headquarters in Menlo Park, California.     
 Connecting with the government, advertisers and other corporations to most effectively 
grow and monetize its Indian user base was contingent on Facebook’s physical presence in the 
country. Opening an office in India facilitated this process for Facebook. The company entered 
numerous partnerships with telecommunication service and hardware providers and several 
digital advertising and marketing agencies. As a result, the number of Indian Facebook users 
grew from 20 million in mid-2010 (Rebiero, 2010) to 50 million in 2011 (Statista, 2011) and 
continues to rise. Similarly, Facebook’s strategy to open an office in Sao Paulo, Brazil in 2011 
led to the tripling of the number of Facebook users in the country within a year.  
6.1.2 Replicating Markets, Creating Consumers 
Most Indians access the internet through their cell phone. Therefore, Facebook has 
adopted a horizontal networking strategy that primarily focuses on the mobile population in the 
country by entering partnerships with the largest players in the country’s telecommunications 
industry. When expanding into foreign countries, “global giants break into new markets and 
effectively reprogram the regional market toward a commercial format,” and they do so not by 
buying or taking over local and regional companies but by entering partnerships with them 
(Arsenault, 2011a, p.116). Facebook picked a localization strategy based on mobile phones 
because of the extent to which the technology permeates Indian society and partnering with the 
largest telecom service and hardware providers in the country proved to be most effective for the 
company.           
 As stated earlier, while 121 million Indians have access to the internet via desktop and 
laptop computers and tablets, a staggering 900 million own mobile phones, making this a large, 
lucrative and untapped market for Facebook. Creating a market for social-networking platforms 
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among India’s mobile population is critical to Facebook’s growth in the country. At the same 
time, due to the website’s large user base it leads among all other Indian websites in terms of 
revenue through advertising and an increasing number of Indian companies are using the website 
as an avenue to engage with and advertise to their target consumers (Internet and Mobile 
Association of India, 2012). Facebook’s large user network presents an incentive to Indian 
telecommunications companies to partner with the company and in the process create a larger 
market for expansion and more consumers for their products.      
 In the past two years Facebook has entered partnerships with most of India’s 
telecommunications giants, all of whom have revenue of more than $1 billion a year. These 
partnerships target both the manufacturing of hardware (i.e. phones) to access Facebook to 
services that make it easier for users to access Facebook through their phones.  
 In 2010, Airtel, the largest mobile telephony provider in India, started offering users free 
access to Facebook’s mobile site, m.facebook.com, without any data charges as part of a two-
month long promotion. New mobile internet users had to simply text the word “Facebook” to a 
number the company provided to access the service (CIOL, 2010) The same year Facebook 
entered partnerships with other telecom giants to provide users free access to 0.facebook.com, a 
lighter, faster version of their Facebook mobile site, for free. These companies included 
Reliance, Aircel, Airtel and Videocon.        
 A year later, in July 2011, Airtel, Reliance, and Aircel, again as part of a promotion, 
started offering their users the “Facebook for Every Phone” application for free and allowed 
them to use the application without incurring any data or mobile charges for a period of three 
months (The Mobile Indian, 2011). The application was tailored by Facebook for users in 
developing countries who access the internet through “dumb phones,” or phones with basic 
30 
 
features and limited capabilities (Van Grove, 2011).  Javier Olivan, Facebook’s Director of 
International Growth, stated that the application was developed specifically to reach Indian users 
who owned cheaper handsets and that the 25 million Facebook mobile users in India was only a 
small percentage (2%) of the total population — the company had “so much work ahead” 
(Madhavan, 2011).           
 The same year Facebook, Airtel and, the Singapore-based mobile solutions provider, 
U2opia partnered to develop Fonetwish, a platform that enabled users to access Facebook via 
USSD (unstructured supplementary support data) instead of a browser. The service was targeted 
to cheaper handsets (Rai, 2011) since penetration of smartphones among Indians remains low4. 
The service, which cost Rs. 1 (approximately 18 cents) a day, could be accessed from mobile 
phones that received service from  Airtel, Aircel, Idea, Videocon, Loop mobile or Tata Docomo 
and operated on any cell phone with text- messaging capabilities.    
 While the partnerships mentioned above dealt with Facebook connectivity, the company 
also entered partnerships to create the hardware with which users could access its platform. In 
October 2011 Tata Docomo, another leading telecommunications corporation, launched a 
Facebook phone that lets users access the website for free. The launch of this phone followed in 
the footsteps of another phone, the Vodafone Blue, by the phone company Vodafone-Essar, 
which was developed in collaboration with Facebook earlier in 2011. This too, provided 
purchasers with a free year of unlimited access to Facebook (The Mobile Indian, 2011). 
 In November 2011, Facebook announced a partnership with MediaTek, a Taiwanese 
company that produces software and chips for low cost phones, with the goal of developing 
Facebook applications for low-end phones (Forbes, 2011). The purpose of the partnership was to 
                                                          
4
 At about 9% in 2012.  
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“bring Facebook to more devices, in more markets around the world and helping users to connect 
and share anywhere, anytime,” according to Vaughan Smith, vice-president of Facebook’s 
Mobile Partnerships and Corporate Development (Gupta, 2011). Though, it is not an Indian 
company, MediaTek has partnerships with popular Indian handset brands Spice and Micromax 
which bring affordable phones to lower income users. This partnership enables these users to 
access Facebook without a computer or expensive smartphone and at the same time allows 
Facebook to access these users and gather more eyeballs for its many advertisers.  
Table 4 Summary of Facebook’s Telecommunications Partnerships in India                                                                                    
Company Indian Market 
Share* 
Connectivity 
Partnership 
Hardware 
Partnership 
Fonetwish USSD 
Access 
Airtel 19.65%      X   
Reliance 16.79%      X   X 
Vodaphone 16.53%       X 
Idea 11.90%    X   X   
Tata Docomo 9.34%   X     
Aircel 6.90%    X   
Videocon 0.61%    X   
Loop 0.36%   X  X   
MediaTek N/A   X           
  *As of December, 2011                                               Market Share Data Source: Telemediatech   
Facebook’s large user base had many Indian companies scrambling to be part of its 
organizational network; a network Facebook has to ensure grows because it is Facebook’s 
product while advertisers are its customers. As a result Facebook has entered partnerships with 
most of the largest players in India’s telecommunications market. Telecommunications 
companies willingly join Facebook’s organizational network because free and easy access to 
Facebook is an incentive for consumers to buy their phones and services. Furthermore, Facebook 
also serves as an effective platform for them to communicate with their current and potential 
customers through targeted advertising and Facebook Pages. While networks can add nodes and 
 expand infinitely (Castells, 2000), the adoption of Facebook’s social network sta
users is contingent on their access to the
service and hardware providers facilitates the spread of Facebook’s social network standards 
among an ever-increasing mobile population. Simila
countries like South Africa, where 80.5% of Facebook users access the platform through their 
mobile phones, depends on the company’s ability to collaborate with South African 
telecommunications companies. 
Figure 2 Network Map Representing 
and Manufacturers 
6.1.3 Switching Advertising and Audience Networks 
The Facebook platform enables advertisers to connect with audiences through 
advertisements, “sponsored stories” and “Facebook Pages”. Facebook acts as a switch, or 
connection point, between its large user network and the advertisers that want to reach thos
(Castells, 2004). Brands can create Facebook Pages to connect to their audiences directly. 
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Facebook Pages are free and companies can customize them to include promotions, offers, 
coupons etc. Indian users are extremely responsive to Like Pages created by their favorite 
brands. A 2011 study by Nielsen India found that direct interaction between consumers and their 
favorite brands on social media was one of the main drivers for social media engagement with 
those brands (Nielsen Wire, 2011). Facebook, by connecting its social network and these 
companies, facilitates this interaction. Furthermore, Facebook also dictates the terms of this 
interaction and can end it whenever a brand violates them, costing them thousands and, in some 
cases, millions of connections with users.        
 Facebook has also entered a number of partnerships with Indian digital marketing and 
advertising agencies to sell advertising space on its website. These agencies represent both local 
and global clients. Therefore, instead of solely pursuing advertisers itself, Facebook uses 
partnerships with these agencies to access advertisers. Facebook has signed Reseller Agreements 
with two Indian advertising agencies, Komli Media and Ozone Media. Komli Media is an 
advertising agency that represents other global brands such as Viacom and MSN and whose 
advertisers include global brands such as Mcdonalds, Kraft and Toyota (Komli Media). Ozone 
Media’s clients include international companies such as Yahoo! and Dell (Saxena, 2012). With 
more than 80% of Facebook’s total revenue dependent on advertising, its connections with these 
agencies are critical to its financial success. These agencies connect Facebook to networks of 
local and global advertisers and can help Facebook maximize its share in a Rs. 3,535 crore, or 
approximately $700 million, Indian digital advertising market (Afaqs, 2012). 
6.1.4 Connecting to Parallel Networks of Application Developers  
By opening up its platform to third-party applications, Facebook offers a standard for 
application developers to connect to Facebook’s organizational network. Developers have access 
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to Facebook’s social graph and they, in turn, help Facebook keep its users online for long periods 
of time. The time a user spends on Facebook is directly proportional to the money Facebook can 
make from that user’s engagement with the platform Furthermore through Facebook Credits, the 
official currency for developers and users to trade virtual goods on Facebook’s platform, the 
company gets a 30% cut of every transaction (Ingram, 2012). As step to further monetize the 
activity of Facebook’s Indian user network, in July 2012 India was one of the first countries 
chosen for the launch of Facebook’s App Center, which helps users find applications that are 
well-suited for them based on their Facebook activity (Times of India, 2012).    
 Since Facebook does not offer any of its own content and, the material that appears on 
the website is largely user-generated, applications created by third-party developers can often be 
tailored to the local. Local developers bring with them knowledge of the taste and preferences of 
Indian culture. Popular applications such as Angry Brides, a game that raises social-awareness 
about dowry (Munshi, 2012), and Saavn, a music application similar to Spotify (Rao, 2012), are 
developed for specific local tastes and audiences.       
 The most valuable standards are those that are adopted by the most number of people 
(Grewal, 2008). Facebook’s large user network acts as an inducement for Indian developers to 
create applications for the website and connect with these users. As mentioned above, these 
developers often create applications specifically tailored to Indian users. Therefore, offering a 
standard for third-party developers to connect with it has proved to be an effective localization 
strategy for Facebook.           
 Facebook’s organizational networking strategies in India have focused primarily on 
getting the country’s large mobile population to join Facebook’s social network. Facebook 
leverages its position as the world’s largest social networking platform to enter partnerships with 
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the country’s largest telecommunications service and hardware providers. These companies’ help 
further circulate Facebook’s social network standards among the Indian population. Partnerships 
with local advertising and marketing agencies bring global and local advertisers to Facebook. 
Opening an office in India has been critical to the formation of these partnerships. While 
telecommunications companies help Facebook expand its user network, local application 
developers offer content that keeps users online for longer periods of time. Furthermore, 
transactions run on Facebook applications are the second largest source of income for the 
company. Local application developers, then, also help Facebook maximize its revenue.  
6.2 How Facebook’s Strategies Differ From and Affect Competitors 
6.2.1 Comparing Strategies  
The top five social networking websites in India, after Facebook, are LinkedIn, Orkut, 
Twitter and, the indigenous, Ibibo and Bharatstudent. Although Facebook surpassed Orkut in 
popularity in 2010, it listed the website as a serious competitor for the Indian market in its SEC 
filing earlier this year (Facebook, 2012). According to Alexa, India is the second-largest market 
for both LinkedIn and Orkut, and the third-largest market for Twitter. As Figure 3 represents, 
Bharatstudent and Ibibo cater solely to Indian users, and India represents a large and important 
market for Orkut5.             
                                                          
5
 18% by itself doesn’t seem to be a very large number, but since Brazil has 60.5% of all Orkut users, it makes India 
the websites second-largest market.  
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Figure 3 Top Six Social Networking Websites – Percentage of Users in India 
Like Facebook, LinkedIn and Google (which owns the social networking websites Orkut 
and Google +) have each opened offices in the Indian cities of Bangalore and Mumbai.6 The 
offices were opened so that the companies could tap into the pool of talent these cities had to 
offer and so that they could successfully expand their business into India by connecting with 
local businesses and advertisers. While Twitter has not opened an office in India, it has entered 
partnerships with mobile service and hardware providers. In October 2009, Airtel launched a five 
month long promotion that enabled users to access Twitter’s mobile site for free (Twitter Blog, 
2009). Recently, in July 2012, the mobile phone manufacturer MediaTek announced that it had 
partnered with Twitter to provide emerging markets with phones that will be pre-loaded with the 
Twitter application as a default feature (MediaTek News, 2012).    
 Making their platform available in local languages is a strategy that Facebook, Twitter 
and Orkut have each adopted to expand into India. In 2007, Orkut launched their website in five 
                                                          
6
 Like Hyderabad, Bangalore too is an IT hub located in southern India. Mumbai is considered to be the business 
capital of India. 
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different Indian languages (Hindi, Bengali, Marathi, Tamil and Telegu) and a transliteration tool 
on Orkut which enabled users to type “Scraps,” analogous to a Wall Post on Facebook, 
phonetically in English and have them appear in Hindi (Orkut blog, 2007). The company also 
actively sought user feedback on the efficacy of the process. In contrast to Orkut, which used 
professionals to translate its website, Facebook and Twitter have used crowdsourcing7 and let its 
users translate the website into the language of their choice. In 2008, Facebook launched a 
Translations application on its website that enabled users to translate the website (Smith, 2008). 
Twitter, abandoning its initial plans for using professional translators, launched its Translation 
Center in February 2011 and added support for Hindi in September 2011 (Twitter Blog, 2011).
 In April 2008, Orkut opened up its platform to third-party developers and allowed them 
to develop applications that could be integrated with the website. India was chosen as the first 
country for the Orkut Applications launch (Paid Content, 2008). Orkut’s applications, however, 
did not gain popularity since Orkut did not integrate games well on its platform and Facebook 
was successful in dislodging Orkut from the position of top social networking site mainly 
because it was perceived as “cool.” (Ribeiro, 2012).       
 Internal networking, partnerships with telecom service and hardware providers, 
localization by supporting Indic languages and opening up its platform to third-party developers 
are strategies that all these companies share. Facebook has the most comprehensive 
internationalization strategy — adopting all four of these effectively — which contributes to it 
being the most successful social networking platform, and the third most popular website in 
India.   
                                                          
7
 A term coined by journalist Jeff Howe (2008) for the practice whereby  businesses outsource jobs traditionally 
performed by professionals and employees to large groups of people, who may or may not be professionals and 
volunteer on their own time and are not paid for their work.  
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Table 5 Summary of Social Networking Platforms’ Strategies in India 
 
Social 
Networking 
Platform/Website 
Percentage of 
users in India 
Office in 
India: 
Yes/No 
Platform open 
to third-party 
developers: 
Yes/No 
Indic 
Languages 
Supported: 
Yes/No 
Partnerships 
with 
Telecom 
Providers 
Yes/No 
Facebook 8% Yes Yes Yes Yes 
LinkedIn 12.3% Yes No No No 
Orkut 18.4% Yes Yes Yes No 
Twitter 6.5% No Yes Yes Yes 
Bharatstudent 84.2% Yes* No No No 
Ibibo 92.2% Yes* Yes No Yes 
* Are companies founded in India  
 
6.2.2 Driving Social Gaming  
The popularity of Facebook games in India has contributed to the creation of a social 
gaming industry in the country. While India had a vibrant gaming community, social gaming is 
new to the country. It has been driven, to a large extent, by the overwhelming popularity of 
games on the Facebook platform. It is common for companies to influence the practices of their 
competitors and drive the creation of new markets and industries in the process of international 
expansion. Today, mobile and online gaming account for 38% of India’s $171 million gaming 
industry (Gyan Analytics, 2012) and Indians account for 8-10 million social gamers online and 
on mobile phones (Singh, 2011).  
The social gaming website, Ibibo was launched in 2007 as a social network and in 2012 
positioned its social network entirely around online and mobile gaming (Saxena, 2012). Ibibo 
was conceived of as an alternative to social networking websites with a global audience 
(Broadband India, 2006); its founder has often stressed that its local-focus is the primary reason 
for its growth (Chibber, 2010). The company has partnerships with the Chinese mobile phone 
manufacturer, Huawei (Telecom Tiger, 2011), and mobile service provider, Aircel (Bleich, 
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2010), adopting a strategy similar to that of Facebook’s. Seeing the potential of social gaming in 
India, the South African media company, Naspers and the Chinese investment group, Tencent, 
have invested almost $40 million dollars into Ibibo over the past four years and now own the 
entire company.           
 In addition to being available on the web and mobile, Ibibo also runs an application on 
Facebook that lets users play its games on the platform. Like Ibibo, which maintains a gaming 
application on Facebook, the Reliance-owned social gaming portal, Zapak signed a deal with the 
Hong-Kong based developer 6Waves to introduce the latter’s games to the Indian market on 
Facebook and process all payments from Indian users (Takahashi, 2010) . Similarly, the Disney-
owned gaming company, Indiagames runs numerous games on Facebook’s platform, in addition 
to other mobile phone and online platforms (Indiagames). Facebook’s standard connects these 
companies to Facebook’s user network and to monetize it, while they simultaneously compete 
with Facebook by expanding their user network through their own and other platforms. 
6.2.3 Network Effects, Indigenous Websites in Decline      
 The most valuable standards are the ones adopted by the most number of people. The 
global popularity of Facebook certainly has fueled its growth in India, but it has also had a 
negative effect on the website’s many competitors. Among its competitors, Ibibo and Hi5 have 
shifted their focus from solely providing a social networking platform to repositioning 
themselves as social gaming networks. As stated earlier, Facebook was successful in dislodging 
Orkut from the position of top social networking site in India primarily because Facebook 
integrated games and applications well on its platform. Orkut, however, still has a large user base 
in India and is considered serious competition by Facebook (Facebook, 2012). Among 
Facebook’s competitors it is the indigenous social-networking websites — offering less valuable 
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standards— that have been hurt the most by its expansion into India. In July 2011, Big Adda, a 
social networking and blogging website owned by Reliance8, closed down its social-networking 
website citing competition from Facebook and other global players as the main reason (Rath, 
2011).                
  In mid-2011 Bharatstudent, a popular social networking website among young Indians, 
announced its integration with Facebook (Bharatstudent.com, 2011). The partnership allowed 
users to log onto Bharatstudent using their Facebook IDs, but not vice-versa. Anticipating 
competition from the spread of Facebook’s user standard, Bharatstudent entered an unequal 
partnership with Facebook where the latter dictates the terms and conditions for inclusion within 
its corporate network.          
 Even among social gaming networks, companies are scrambling to be a part of 
Facebook’s organizational network by developing games for the website. As stated earlier, while 
Facebook itself does not localize applications and features for its platform, by circulating 
standards among networks of developers, it lets them introduce region-specific content. For 
example, the Reliance-owned gaming portal Zapak runs applications that let users access all its 
games on Facebook’s platform. Facebook, then, is offering its users access to the largest user 
network and localized content.        
 Facebook’s large user base makes it standards valuable, but being physically located in 
Menlo Park, California gives Facebook an advantage over its local, Indian competitors. From its 
early stages, Facebook was well connected to financial networks and venture capitalists. The 
ability to create networks, or network-making power, is a source of immense power in the 
network society, a power that most local websites lack. As a result, Facebook’s competitors are 
faced with the choice of joining the social networking platforms organizational network or see 
                                                          
8
 The mobile service provider, which also owns Zapak, the social gaming portal.  
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their number of users and revenues dwindle. As Figure 4 indicates, among the indigenous social 
networking and gaming platforms, several have chosen to connect to Facebook’s organizational 
network.  
Figure 4 Network Map Representing the Impact on Social Networking and Social Gaming 
Platforms in India 
 
6.3 How Facebook Spreads its Standards among Users 
6.3.1 Standards so users “can all connect” 
Facebook, which started as an exclusive network for college students, changed its 
standards for inclusion on September 26, 2006 by allowing anyone with an email address and 
those who declared themselves to be at least 13-years-old to create an account on its website. 
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Access to Facebook for users is free, as users are its product, while advertisers are its customers. 
To reach as many Indians as possible and include them in its user network, Facebook has 
effectively adapted its strategies to focus on the nation's large mobile population. As detailed in 
section one of this analysis, partnerships with the largest mobile service providers and hardware 
manufacturers have spread Facebook’s user standard among a significant cross-section of 
society. Users with smart phones have the option of using a Facebook application or Facebook’s 
mobile site to access the platform; and those with lower-end phones can employ a text-message 
based USSD service to access their accounts. In October 2012, Facebook India launched its own 
promotion by offering Rs. 50 (about $1 USD) to users who signed up for their mobile site and an 
additional Rs. 50 for every referral made (Medianama, 2012).  
Facebook’s user network is programmed to grow indefinitely; however, the network’s 
growth is dependent on the adoption of its standards by user nodes. By targeting the country’s 
large mobile population, Facebook has ensured the constant addition of user nodes to its social 
network by making it as simple as possible for Indians to adopt its user-level network standards. 
Facebook has effectively adapted its strategy to the technology available in India, but the 
successful replication of this strategy in other countries depends entirely on the willingness of 
local corporations to connect to Facebook and help it circulate its user standards. Furthermore, 
government regulations can block the spread of standards too, as is the case in China. While 
offering standards for all users can be an effective strategy, its success is entirely predicated on 
local businesses and corporations’ desire to connect to Facebook and the government’s 
acquiescence to the platform’s expansion into the state.  
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6.3.2 Crowdsourcing Language Translation  
Section two of this analysis highlights how the translation of their platform into Indic 
languages is a strategy that global internet companies have adopted to successfully expand their 
business into India. This includes translations by professionals and by using crowdsourcing to 
translate the website into various Indic languages. In 2008, Facebook launched its Translation 
Application through which users could submit translations of phrases on Facebook and vote on 
translations by other users (Smith 2008).        
 At the time, 80% of internet users lived in urban areas and spoke English. However, 
translating the website into other languages was important for Facebook to expand its network to 
add users from non-urban areas and access India’s large mobile population. By May 2009, Indian 
users could access Facebook in one of seven languages -English, Hindi, Bengali, Punjabi, 
Telugu, Tamil and Malayalam (Lee, 2009). The proliferation of cheaper smartphones and mobile 
handsets and the expansion of internet infrastructure in the country are rapidly changing the 
profile of Indian internet users (Rana, 2012; Sharma & Thoppil, 2011). As a result, more and 
more non-English speakers and non-urban dwellers have access to these technologies. 
Facebook’s strategy to crowdsource translations into many Indian languages makes it easier for 
these new internet and mobile users to join Facebook’s social network and for Facebook to 
further grow by adding nodes to their user network and by monetizing their activity. 
6.3.3 Cycle of Standard Circulation  
Facebook’s expansion in India has followed a cyclical pattern. The website’s user base 
has made it an attractive avenue for advertising and marketing, which means that large 
corporations in the region readily share Facebook’s goal or program for expansion. They see the 
website as a vehicle to connect with potential and actual consumers. These corporations help 
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circulate Facebook’s standard at the individual/user level, which leads to an increase in 
Facebook’s user base. This pattern is illustrated by examining which Indian brands use Facebook 
most extensively to connect with their audiences. Tata Docomo, Vodafone and Idea, three of the 
telecommunications companies that have entered partnerships with Facebook, are the first, 
second and eighth most popular brands on the website among Indian users (Social Bakers, 2012).     
Table 6 Top Ten brands on Facebook India      Data Source: Social Bakers  
Rank on Facebook 
India 
Company Number of Fans on 
Facebook 
1 Tata Docomo 9, 719, 900 
2 Vodaphone 4, 751, 284 
3 Kingfisher 4,733,199 
4 Fastrack 4,599, 360 
5 Nokia India 4,594,487 
6 Samsung Mobile  4,029,491 
7 Axe Angels Club 3,905,012 
8 Idea 3,837,406 
9 Shoppers Stop 3,772,251 
10 Pepsi India 3,415,765 
 
Facebook’s position as a switch, or a connecting point, between corporate and advertising 
networks and its user network, is a source of power that allows it to assert control over others. 
Facebook has the ability to advance the goals of certain corporate and advertising networks and 
at the same time has the power to disrupt connections between these networks. In 2011, 
Facebook India took down the official pages for two brands, Cadbury and Pizza Hut India, from 
its website due to violations of promotion guidelines (Iyer, 2011). According to Facebook’s 
promotional guidelines, brands have to develop external applications or tabs to run promotions 
and offers. Because these companies used Facebook’s Wall and Like applications in their 
promotions, Facebook removed their pages. Considering that Cadbury and Pizza Hut India are in 
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the top brands by audience response rate on Facebook, the company’s ability to shut down these 
brands pages allows Facebook to dictate the rules and provides it with power over nodes within 
its internal network. Facebook provides a common standard for networks of users to connect to 
brands, but companies have to follow the rules set forth by Facebook or risk losing the audiences 
they have amassed over the years.        
 Not only does Facebook hold power over companies that use its platform to connect with 
their audiences, but it also poses a threat to competing platforms. This includes indigenous social 
networking platforms, whose inability to attract businesses may result in the decline and possible 
elimination of its standards. While this may signal the dominance of Western new media on local 
business and culture, this section creates a far more complicated picture. Because people tend to 
favor their own culture, Facebook has to localize its content to appeal to users. It does this by 
crowdsourcing language translations and circulating its standards among application developers. 
Facebook also depends on key connections with local businesses to increase its revenue through 
advertising and the number of users in its social network. Furthermore, in countries where the 
government protects its market for local internet companies, such as China, Facebook cannot 
leverage its position as a switch between advertiser and audience networks to expand 
successfully and grow its organizational and user networks. Collaboration with other 
corporations and businesses and localization of content are the key to Facebook’s global 
expansion. As the next section details, the state can act to both facilitate and hinder these 
processes.   
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6. 4 How the Indian State Facilitates and Mitigates the Spread of Facebook’s Standards  
6.4.1 Deregulation and Liberalization of the Indian Economy    
 Facebook’s international expansion also depends on favorable local regulations set by the 
state. In the early 1990s the Indian government adopted economic reforms that opened the 
country up to foreign direct investments (FDI) and trade. Following decolonization in 1947, 
India adopted a mixed-economy model, closely resembling a Socialist state model. In 1991, 
facing bankruptcy, the nation switched to a market-driven economy. Continuing economic 
liberalization the Indian government disbanded the monopoly of Department of 
Telecommunications and heavily deregulated the telecommunications sector in 1992 (Bai, 
Ganesan & Srivasta, 2007). New I.T. policies adopted by the government, to aid India’s 
“integration with the global economy,” produced the internet boom of 1998-2003 (Wolcott & 
Goodman, 2003, p.560). This series of reforms has made India one of the largest and most 
competitive telecommunications markets in the world  (Business Review India, 2012) and home 
to the world’s third largest Internet population (Vaidyanathan, 2012).     
 Almost two decades later, these reforms are critical to Facebook’s expansion into the 
country. The internet infrastructure laid by the government and the 900 million mobile 
connections, made possible by a competitive market, enable millions of Indians to access 
Facebook and provide a massive potential audience for the company. Furthermore, the presence 
of global businesses in the Indian market who use Facebook to directly connect with their 
consumers and in turn circulate Facebook’s user standards, is facilitated by the drastic changes 
the government made to the economy 22 years ago. As the preceding sections show, Facebook’s 
success in India is predicated on how well it leverages its large user network to enter partnerships 
with other established players in the Indian market in order to expand its business and maximize 
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its profits. A robust, deregulated and liberalized economy provides the ideal conditions for 
Facebook’s expansion and the addition of nodes to its user and organizational network. 
6.4.2 Counterpower and Resistance via the Indian State  
While Facebook has been successful in overcoming competition from both Indian and 
global social networking websites, there has been resistance from the Indian government. But 
this resistance does not come in the form of the Indian government protecting its market for 
indigenous companies, rather through the state’s attempt to change the programming of 
Facebook’s network. Since its arrival in India, the government has put pressure on Facebook to 
pre-screen its content and remove all objectionable material from its website. In January 2012, 
the Indian government granted the Department of Information and Technology sanction to 
prosecute Facebook for not complying with the demand that it remove all objectionable content 
that could incite enmity between different groups (Singh, 2012).  
Facebook’s earlier response to the government’s request to pre-screen material posted on 
its website was that its desire was to keep the website as free and neutral as possible for its users 
and that the website already included features that allowed users to report objectionable content 
(Vikas, 2011). Responding to Facebook’s statement Kapil Sibal, India’s Human Resource 
Development Minister, expressed that it was his aim that “insulting material never gets uploaded. 
We will evolve guidelines and mechanisms to deal with the issue. [The companies] will have to 
give us the data, where these images are being uploaded and who is doing it” (BBC News, 2011). 
In a March 2012 summons order issued both to Facebook Inc. and Facebook India, Judge Sudesh 
Kumar cited the company’s actions  as the reason for continuing with the case, “ instead of 
regulating the undesirable and offensive content ...[Facebook has] promoted the same for 
increasing the profits and promoting their business” (CIS, 2012). Facebook now faces limited 
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choices on how to proceed on this issue. Giving in to the government’s demands would entail 
altering the programming of its network. At the same time if prosecuted for leaving 
objectionable material on its website, the responsible party can face 3-5 years in prison. 
More recently in August 2012, citing the threat of impending communal violence, the 
Indian government blocked access to several Facebook pages temporarily. The government 
claimed that it was responding to the circulation of misinformation through websites and text 
messaging, which had fuelled rumors that Muslims were planning revenge attacks for the 
violence occurring in the northeastern state of Assam. The rumors had led tens of thousands of 
migrants of northeastern descent to leave metropolitan cities such as Mumbai and Bangalore 
(Tripathy & Bhattacharjya, 2012). The Facebook pages were among 300 total web pages blocked 
by the Indian government. The Bangalore-based Center for Internet and Society noted that of all 
the webpages being blocked 33% were Facebook pages and profiles (Prakash, 2012) making it 
the most censored website in India. These websites were blocked under the updated version of 
the Information Technology Act of 2000. In 2008, the Indian government had made amendments 
to the act to give the government the power to monitor and block websites and intercept online 
conversations (Agarwal & D’Monte, 2011).  
In the past year, the mainstream news media in India, comprised mainly of newspapers, 
magazines and television channels, has started limiting their coverage of online posts on 
Facebook and other social media websites.9 Numerous news channels have run panels that 
discuss the many dangers of social media10 and newspapers have published editorials and stories 
                                                          
9
 The move was somewhat reminiscent of France’s on-air Facebook ban, only there was no official law or ban 
passed and consent was implicit. For an example of the change in social-media coverage policy of CNN-IBN, one of 
India’s leading English-language television channels, see: CNN-IBN’s New Social Media Guidelines: Limits 
Twitter, Facebook, LinkedIn Content In TV Shows (http://www.medianama.com/2012/08/223-cnn-ibns-new-social-
media-guidelines-limits-twitter-facebook-linkedin-content-in-tv-shows/).  
10
 For examples of mainstream television media see: CNN IBN’s Face the Nation: Is social media above the law of 
the land (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aXiv4jGzFzw) and Face the Nation: Does social media offer more 
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on the downsides and dangers of social media11. The Indian government commissioned ads 
specifically warning people about the dangers of using Facebook, so that they could be run in 
print publications (Figure 5-7). 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
value than mainstream media? (http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2sOJQD-6m-0); NDTV’s The North East 
Conundrum: Regulating Social Media the Answer? (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=YQRvhgUqep4).  
11
 For examples of mainstream print media see: The Times of India’s  – Hidden Dangers of Facebook 
(http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-07-29/social-media/32922835_1_angry-birds-friends-facebook-
age-profile-picture) and Social-media Becomes a Double Edged Sword 
(http://articles.timesofindia.indiatimes.com/2012-08-21/social-media/33302561_1_social-media-india-pages-
twitter).  
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Figure 5 Government Issued Print Ad Warning Indians to use Facebook with Caution  
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Figure 6 Government Issued Print Ad Warning Indians to use Facebook with Caution 
 
 
 
 
52 
 
                                                               
Figure 7 Government Issued Print Ad Warning Indians to use Facebook with Caution 
In the network society “power and counterpower aim fundamentally at influencing the 
neural networks in the human minds by using mass communication networks and mass self-
communication networks” (Castells, 2011, p.773). Although the government did not employ 
mass self-communication networks to exercise its counterpower against Facebook, it blocked 
these networks. The government could so because it controls the internet infrastructure, and 
therefore, the physical switch between Facebook and its Indian user network. Mass 
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communication networks, comprised of advertisements, print and television media aimed at 
influencing the minds of Facebook users by warning them of the dangers of the Facebook 
platform. The government, by itself, lacks the credibility and resources to influence minds, but 
with the support of the Indian legal community and the mainstream print and television media it 
acted to change perceptions about Facebook use in the country and to block Facebook’s access to 
its user network in India and to exert power on Facebook to comply with the its demands.  
 As this section argues, the success of Facebook’s expansion into any country depends on 
whether the government creates a favorable environment for Facebook to connect with other 
businesses and users. In India, economic initiatives have created the optimal conditions for 
Facebook to enter partnerships with telecommunications companies and local businesses who 
share Facebook’s goal to expand its user network. The political environment, however, has led to 
regulations that restrict Facebook’s growth in the country. A liberal economy and a permissive, 
democratic and free political environment are prerequisites for Facebook’s successful expansion 
into any nation. The company does not act in isolation and needs to connect to local partners, 
who provide its revenue through advertising and also help circulate its user standards, to succeed 
in any country. While most BRICS countries provide dynamic economies with plenty of room 
for Facebook’s expansion, a fragile political environment may lead to resistance from 
governments. In the case of China we see both an unfavorable economy, with its markets 
protected for local companies, and a highly restrictive political environment, which will block 
the expansion of Facebook into the country.  
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
Having examined Facebook’s expansion strategies in India using a meso-level network 
analysis this thesis illustrates that Facebook’s success in India is dependent on how well it 
leverages its large user network to add nodes to its organizational and social networks and the 
effect it has on competition. The theoretical framework used is particularly well suited to 
examine the expansion of social networking platforms, because they benefit most from network 
effects. As more nodes join their network, they become more valuable and as they grow larger, 
the cost network exclusion keeps increasing. Facebook has successfully leveraged this power in 
its expansion into India as users and businesses, even competitors, willingly join its network.
 However, two preconditions emerge for Facebook’s successful expansion into a country. 
This thesis shows that Facebook relies on making important connections with local partners to 
grow on the user and organizational level. A liberalized, open economy provides Facebook with 
access to other companies who share the social networking platform’s goal to program the 
market to a commercial format. They use the Facebook platform to maintain and increase their 
consumer base and simultaneously circulate Facebook’s user network standard. As a result, 
Facebook’s social network numbers and revenue continue to rise.      
 A second condition key to Facebook’s growth in a country is a fairly permissive political 
environment. As is illustrated in the Indian case, many governments struggle to control the 
millions of mass-self communication network connections facilitated by Facebook’s user 
network. Any government that sees Facebook as a threat to their nation’s political stability, or as 
a disruption to their power, will block the platform’s access to users. Facebook relies on its user 
network and on local application developers to create local-specific content. But this strategy 
fails to work when the company cannot access users in a country. 
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A drawback of this study is that the financial details of Facebook’s partnerships with 
Indian mobile corporations, businesses, and marketing agencies are unavailable. Adding these 
details as more information becomes available will strengthen the analysis. Addressing the role 
culture plays in the acceptance of Facebook’s standards by users was beyond the scope of this 
project. Future research should focus on the role the dominance of American culture plays in the 
adoption of Facebook’s standards among users. This thesis illustrates the extent to which 
Facebook’s successful expansion into developing countries is predicated on local companies’ 
willingness to join Facebook’s organizational network. However, further research should also 
look into whether Facebook privileges American culture, as well as the social and cultural 
implications of its expansion into foreign countries.        
 A meso-level view of Facebook’s organizational network illustrates how Facebook 
depends on both partners and competitors to keep growing in India and vice-versa. For example, 
social gaming in India is a large and competitive market and has attracted a number of local and 
global players. These players promote their games on Facebook and help Facebook attract more 
users, keeping them on the website for longer and monetize their activities. What emerges here is 
not a picture of domination and exploitation, but that of co-operation between local and global 
corporations and companies.           
 As mentioned earlier in the paper, the organization of businesses, people, governments 
and corporations in networks does not mean that the Network Society is devoid of power. Power 
in the Network Society is exercised through these networks. This is illustrated well in the case of 
Facebook’s expansion into India. Facebook holds power over the many companies and 
developers that adopt its standards and join its organizational networks. Equal partnerships are 
only made with the largest corporations in telecommunications industry, or those who have 
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access to large user and financial networks which can be leveraged in their partnership with 
Facebook. Either the biggest Indian conglomerates or the largest global investment firms back 
Facebook’s fiercest competitors. While a majority of these firms are Western, the presence of 
Indian, Chinese and South African corporations illuminates a more complex picture than one that 
shows inequality in terms of a simple global North-South economic divide. Among these global 
players, Facebook benefits the most from its position in Menlo Park, the heart of Silicon Valley, 
as this provides it with crucial connections to financial networks.     
 The current top social-networking websites in India, Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn and 
Orkut, are all Western-based companies. The global popularity of these social-networking 
websites has made them attractive to both audiences and advertisers, alike. Global, regional and 
local corporations, share these companies’ goal, which is to expand their market share, and 
readily join their internal networks. Power, however, is not shared equally within these networks. 
Facebook can leverage its network power over these corporations in order to achieve its goals. 
While network power is the power of standards over the components of the network it 
“ultimately favors the interests of both a specific set of social actors at the source of network 
formation and also of the establishment of the standards (protocols of communication” (Castells, 
2011, p. 775). Since Facebook determines the standards for inclusion in its social-network it is 
disproportionately advantaged over others nodes in its corporate network.                                                
 One source of immense power in the network society is the elimination of competing 
standards over time. Although, in the process of its expansion into developing countries, 
Facebook does not buy or take over other organizations, the perceived value of being a part of its 
network makes actors give up other standards.  Facebook, then, is not exercising its power 
through domination, but because it spreads its standards through every possible avenue, the costs 
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associated with not being a part of its network keep increasing. While corporations flock toward 
adopting Facebook’s standards, local and regional competition languishes because their 
standards are not perceived as valuable.                     
The state, however, also presents a challenge to Facebook’s unbridled expansion. 
Although two decades of economic liberalization and the deregulation of the telecommunications 
industry by the Indian government have provided Facebook the optimal conditions to expand its 
business, the government also makes several attempts to block this expansion.  It does so by 
exercising its counterpower to change the programming of Facebook’s network. While China 
and Vietnam have blocked the expansion of both Facebook’s user and internal network, the 
Indian government wants the website to change its policies on censorship and the production of 
user-generated content. Whether Facebook will leverage its power within its corporate network 
to respond to the Indian government or give into the government’s demands is yet to be seen. 
What is guaranteed is that Facebook’s unique features of being the world’s most popular social 
networking website and its position as a switch between corporate and consumer networks will 
lead to its further growth and the elimination of competition over time.  
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